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STOCK DIVIDENDS AS INCOME
the case of Towne v. Eisner, the United States Supreme Court
I N has
recently held that under the Income Tax Law of
the
I9I3,

stock dividends received by a shareholder during the year I9I4
could not be taxed upon their full par value, where the corporate
surplus thus distributed all accrued prior to January I, I9I3. The
Treasury Department subsequently announced that the decision is
not applicable to the Income Tax Law of I9I6.1 It is the purpose
of this article to review the case of Towne v. Eisner,2 and then to
discuss the soundness of the position taken by the Secretary of the
Tre~sury. Thus two general questions are presented. The first is,
"Can the decision of the Supreme Court in the Towne Case be upheld?" The second is, "Is that section of the Income Tax Law
of I9I6 that states that stock dividends are income and taxable,
constitutional?" These questions will be dealt with in order. 2&
I
CAN '!'HE CASE OF 'l'OWNE V. EISNER BE UPHELD?

It is believed that this question must be answered in the affirmative. It is to be remembered that the corporate surplus that was
transferred to capital and distributed among the shareholders during the year I9I4 was all earned prior to January I, I9I3. The income tax law of I9I3 required that the "gains, profits and income"
must have accrued after March I, I9I3, if they were to be taxed
as income for the calendar year. 8 Giving the words "gains and
profits" their broadest interpretation, it cannot be said that the
shareholders receiving these stock dividends had at that moment
anything of value,-any gain or profit-which they did not have
on March I, I9I3, before the transfer from undivided surplus to
capital was made, other than, perhaps, some slight advantage growing out of the fact that their shares of stock had an increased marketability which was due to the fact that the original shares of
stock had been replaced by several of a lower par value. In the
'Letter of Commission, dated Jan. 10, 1918, addressed to Collectors of Internal Rev·
enue.
2 245 \V. S. 418, decided by the United States Supreme Court, Jan. 7, 1918.
2a See the article "Corporate Earnings as 'Gains, Profit and Income,' as Depending
upon the Time of their Accrual" by Robert M. Drysdale and Maurice C. McGiffin, 16
Mich. L. Rev. 232.
8 38 St. L. 168, 4 Fed. St. Ann. (2nd ed.) 241.
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Towne Case the Supreme Court was not called upon to determine
whether or not such an increase in value arising out of the better
marketability of the shares of stock was income and taxable as
such, The narrow question presented w~s whether or not the
plaintiff shareholder had received gains, profits or income in the
amount of $4I7,450. Clearly he had not, and the decision of the
district court was properly reversed.

II
IS THAT PROVISION OF THI': INCOME TAX LAW OF I9I6, WHICH DECLARES THAT STOCK DIVIDENDS ARE INCOME AND TAXABLE,
CONSTITUTIONAL?.

It is submitted that this question, too, must be answered in the
affirmative.
Prior to the Sixteenth Amendment, there was no constitutional
provision dealing specifically with the power to tax incomes. It has
been held,i however, that Congress always had the power to levy
income taxes under the authority conferred upon Congress by sec.
8 of Article I5 "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises," as a part included in the whole. The Constitution contains
a further requirement that all direct taxes shall be apportioned. 0
Mr. Justice FULLER in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Compa]iy,1
at page 557, aptly summed up the constitutional taxation requirements as follows:
"In the matter of taxation, the constitution recognizes two
great classes of direct and indirect taxes, and lays down two
rules by which their imposition must be governed, namely,
the rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the rule of
uniformity as to duties, imposts and excises."
'Brushaber v. U. P. R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 60 L Ed. 493, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452,
' Consti~ution, Article I, Section 1, Clause 8, provides:
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts
and e.'tcises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general
welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uni·
form throughout the United States."
e Constitution, Art. I, Section 2, Clause 3, provides:
"Direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states * * * accord·
ing to .their respective numbers."
Constitution, Art. I, Section 9, Clause 4, provides:
"No capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to
the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken."
T 157 U. S. 429, 39 L. Ed. 759, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 673.
158 U. S. 601, 39 L. Ed. uoB, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 912.
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In 1894, an act was passed,8 laying a tax on incomes from all
dasses of property and other sources of revenue, which was not apportioned, and which therefore was of course assumed to come
within the classification of excises, duties and imposts, which were
subject to the rule of uniformity, but not to the rule of apportionment. The constitutional validity of this law was challenged on
the ground that it did not fail within the class of excises, duties and
imposts, but was direct in the constitutional sense, and was therefore void for want of apportionment. The Supreme Court, in the
case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trnst Company 0 had this
question presented to it and held that the law was unconstitutional
because, in the ·substance of things, it was direct on property in a
~onstitutional sense, since to burden an income by a tax was, from
the point of substance, to burden the property from which the income was derived, and thus accomplish the very thing which the
provision as to apportionment of direct taxes was adopted to. prevent.
Thereafter, on February 25, 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment be<:ame effective. It provides :
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to
any census or enumeration."
On October 13, 1913, the Internal Revenue Act of 1913 was
passed.10 This act was held to be constitutional in the case of Bmshaber v. U. P. Ry. Co.,11 where the history outlined above is set
forth more in detail. From the opinon in the Brushaoer Case, the
following propositions may be deduced:
(a) Congress has power to levy taxes on all properties
and upon all incomes.
(b) Direct taxes on property, other than income taxes,
must be apportioned.
( c) In all cases, indirect taxes must be uniform.
( d) By virtue of the Sixteenth Amendment, income taxes
need not be apportioned, and this is true even though such
income taxes, in their substance, are direct taxes imposed because of the ownership of property, either real or personal.
8

28 Stat. at L. so9, Chap. 349.
IS7 U. S. 429, 39 L. Ed. 7S9• IS Sup. Ct. Rep, 673,
IS8 U. S. 6oI, 39 L. Ed. IIo8, IS Sup. Ct. Rep. 912.
1 0 Sec. II, Chap. I6, 38 Stat. at L. I66.
n 240 U. S. I, 60 L. Ed. 493, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4s2.
9
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It is thus apparent that Congress could tax a corporation on its
capital stock as well as upon its income, and likewise could' tax an
fodividual on his share of the capital stock in a corporation, as well
as 011 his income derived therefrom. Congress therefore has the
power to tax stock dividends. The Internal Revenue Act of 1916
does not apportion the taxes according to any census or enumeration. The section of the Act of 1916 which is under consideration
must be upheld if this is an indirect tax, because clearly there is
geographical uniformity, and that is the only kind of uniformity
required by the constitution.12
However, it is expressly stated by the Supreme Court in the
Bmsh<iber Case that the Sixteenth Amendment does not do away
with the requirement of apportionment of direct taxes, in any case
other than that of an income tax. Therefore this tax is only invalid
if in the ~rst place it is not an income tax, and if in the second
place, it is a direct tax. What, then, was the meaning of the word
"income," as used in the Sixteenth Amendment?
In 1912 the leading dictionaries defined "income" as the annual
receipts, gains, profits or emoluments derived from capital invested.18 Income is commonly thought of as being money only. It is
more correct to say that it is usually measured in terms of money,
but that gains, profits and income are actually synonymous. It would
seem, therefore, that a shareholder has received income, under these
definitions, when the corporation has accumulated a surplus within a
given year, whether or not this surplus has been transferred to cap12 Brusbaber
12

v. U. P. Ry. Co., supra.
Definitions of "income":
The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia: "That which comes in to a person
as payment for labor or services rendered in some office, or as gain from lands,
business, tlv! investment of capital, etc.; receipts or emoluments regularly acaccruing, ~!ther in a given time, or, when unqualified, annually; the annual
receipt of a person or a corporation; revenue."
The Oxford Dictionary: "That .which comes in as the periodical product
of one's work, business, lands, or investment (considered in reference to its
amount, and commonly expressed in terms of money); annual or periodical receipts accruing to a person or corporation; revenue."
The New Standard Dictionary: "The amount of money coming to a person
or corporation within a specified time or regularly (when unqualified, annually),
whether as payment for services, interest, or profit from investment; revenue."
Webster's New International Dictionary: "That gain or recurrent benefit
(usually measured in money) which proceeds from labor, business or property;
commercial revenue or receipts of any kind, including wages or salaries, the
proceeds of agriculture or commerce, the rents of houses, or the return on in·
vestments. * * * Synonyms: Gain, profit, proceeds, interest, emoluments, produce."
Worcester's Dictionary: "Gain derived from any business or property;
produce, profit, revenue."
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ital stock or distributed in stock dividends. To illustrate: Take a
corporation with a fully paid capital stock of $1,000, consisting of
l,ooo shares of stock, held by l,ooo shareholders, each share of an
approximate value of $r.oo. Suppose that this corporation accumulates a surplus of $1,000 during the year 1917. Then each shareholder, at that time, has something that is worth more than one
dollar if he chooses to sell his share of stock. Can it be said that no
gain or profit has accrued to him during the y~ar of 1917 merely because he chooses to retain his share in the expectation that it may
become more valuable during the next year? If it be assumed that
income-gains and profits-need not be money or cash, but only
need be measured in terms of money or cash, it would appear that
an individual shareholder has received income during a given calendar year if in that year his share of stock has increased in value.
It is not the declaration of a stock dividend that gives him this
profit, but the fact that his undivided share in the corporate enterprise has increased in worth. It is thus conceivable that an individual shareholder receives income--something in the form of a
gain or profit-in exact proportion to the increase in value of the
capital he has invested. Whether or not Congress will take it upon
itself to tax such income before a stock or cash dividend has been
declared is a different question. But it is submitted that a cash dividend, a stock dividend, or an undivided surplus of a corporation may
be termed the income of a shareholder under the definition of income as laid down by the leading dictionaries.
If the legal definitions of income, which were pronounced ·by the
Supreme Court prior to the Sixteenth Amendment, are also consistent with the principles above laid down then we must say that
Congress could state that stock dividends received by a shareholder
were income and taxable as such. It is only necessary to say that
the Supreme Court believed that a corporate undivided: surplus or
the stock dividend received by an individual shareholder coield be
termed his income. The question then to be decided is whether or
not Congress intended that it should be so considered.
There are several United States Supreme Court decisions defining income. One of the earliest is the case of Brainard, Collector,
v. H11bbard.U· This was a suit to recover back money paid by plaintiff, under protest, as a tax on his income for the year 1864 under
the Income Tax Law of l864.1 G Plaintiff was a shareholder in a
corporation and was taxed on his proportional ~hare of the corporate undivided surplus that had accrued during the year 1864.
"12

\Vall.

1, 20

L. Ed. 272, decided in

1871.
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Plaintiff contended that his interest in such corporate profits was
not legally subject to any such assessment and levy as it appeared
fhat the corporation had invested the profits in part in real estate,
macl}inery and raw materials proper for carrying on the business,
and that the same remained so invested at the time the duties were
assessed and collected. Part only of the profits of that year were
so invested, and it was that part of the same which was not included in the dividends of the year, and which plaintiff. refused to
add to the list he delivered to the assessor, and which was the subject of controversy. The Supreme Court held that plaintiff bad no
right of action, inasmuch as no appeal had been taken seasonably ;
and that even though this had been done, still plaintiff bad been
taxed properly because his share in the undivided corporate profits
was income and taxable as such. The court interpreted the act and
found a clear intention on the part of Congress to tax such income
as plaintiff's own gains and profits, and then held that those profits
were income.16
Here then is a clear statement by the Supreme Court of the
United States to the effect that a shareholder's interest in the undivided annual profits of a corporation was to be considered as income when the Congress evidenced an intention to tax such income.
If the corporate surplus which is invested in real estate and machin11 13
10 At

Stat. at L. 281.
277 of 20 L. Ed. the court says:
"Decided cases are referred to in which it is held that a stockholder has
no title for certain purposes to the earnings, net or otherwise, of a railroad
prior to the dividend being declared, and it cannot be. doubted that those decisions
are correct as applied to the respective subject-matters invoived in the controversies. Minot v. Payne, 99 Mass., 106; Goodwin v. Hardy, 57 Me., 145. Grant
all that; still it is true that the owner of a share of stock in a corporation holds
the share with all its incidents, and that among those incidents is the right to
receive all future dividends, not then divided. Profits are incident to the share
to which the owner at once becomes entitled provided he remains a member of
the corporation until a dividend is made. March v. Railroad, 43 N. H. 520.
Regarded as an incident to the shares, undivided profits are property of the
shareholder, and as such are the proper subject of sale, gift or devise. Undi·
vided profits invested in real estate, machinery or raw material, for the purpose
of being manufactured, are investments in which the stockholders are interested,
and when such profits are actually appropriated to the payment of the debts of
the corporation, they serve to increase the market value of the shares, whether
held by the original subscribers or by assignees. But t11e decisive answer to the

proposition is that Co11gress possesses t11e power to lay and collect ta:res, duties,
imposts and e:rcises, and it is as competent for Congress to ta:r annual gains
and prbfits before they are divided among the holders of the stock as afterwards,
and it is clear that Congress did direct that all such gains and profits, whether
divided or otherwise, should be included in estimating tlie annual gains, profits
or income liable to ta.ration under the provisions of tliat Act. Annual gains
oHd profits, wlretlrer di'tided or not, are property, and, therefore, are ta:rable."
(Italics ours.)
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ery constitutes income of the shareholders, then clearly a stock dividend would be no different. And the intention of Congress in the
Act of 1916 is unmistakable.17
The next decision is that of Bailey v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Conipany.18 In this case the Supreme Court again stated that the earnings of the company belonged to the shareholders. The case .is no
authority on its facts, because the tax was levied against the cor·
poration, but it is important to be familiar with its holding in view
of the later language of the Supreme Court when discussing this
decision in the case of Gibbons v. Mahon.19 The Bailey Case· has la!nguage to the effect that corporate earnings belong to the shareholders. If this is so, then corporate earnings are alike corporate income and the income of the shareholders. Each has received a
profit arising out of capital invested. The corporate profit is money.
The shareholder's profit is something of value that can be turned
into money.
In the famous case of Gibbons v. Mahon, the term "income" was
again defined. But a reference to the facts of the case again shows
that the Supreme Court·was deciding what income might be, and
not what income must be. It was here held that as between life tenant and remainderman, where a clear intention to give stock dividends to the remainderman is shown, this intention will be followed. The court reasons that stock dividends are usually thought
of as capital. It was to be presumed that the testator intended that
the usual presumption was to be followed, and that the life tenant
should not take if the corporation declared a stock dividend ·rather
than a cash dividend. But it is submitted that the decision goes off
on the intention of the testator rather than the necessary, as distinguished from the usual, meaning of income. Suppose that the
bequest had read "All income is to go to the life tenant, and stock
dividends are to be considered as income." Would not the Supreme
Court have held that the stock dividends were to go to the life
tenant as the testator intended? When the general law applicable to
11 Act of Sept. 8, 1916, part l, sec. 2:

"Sec. 2. " " " (a) the term 'dividends' as used in this title shall be held to
mean any distribution made or ordered to be made by a corporation, " " " and
payable to its shareholders, whether in cash or in stock of the corpor=•ion, " * "
which stock dividend shall be considered income, to the amount of its cash value."
18 22 Wall. 604, 22 L. Ed. 840, decided in 1875. Here the Income Tax Law of 1864
was again before the Supreme Court. The narrow question presented to the court was
whether or not certain "interest certificates" issued to the stockholders were "dividends
in scrip" which were taxable to the corporation under the law of 1864. The court
found that said '.'interest certificates" bore all the attributes of "dividends in scrip" and
held them to be taxable.
10 136 U. S. 549, 34 L. Ed. 525, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1057, decided in 1890.
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situations of this nature is considered, this becomes apparent. Matters of fairness between the parties and the intention of the testator
govern rather than the intrinsic distinction between capital and incom~. The method of approach is, who in justice is entitled to this
benefit? The party intended by the testator. Then it iS often said
by way of dictum, "The life tenant is entitled to this dividend;
therefore it is income." But the courts do not say, "This is income;
therefore it goes to the life.tenant regardless of the intention of the
testator." 20 In the Gibbons Case, counsel for the life tenant cited the
case of Baile)• v. Railway. The Supreme Court stated that a different
rule could well apply as between life tenant and remainderman, and
between the government and one sought to be taxed. 21 From this it
20 There are at least three distinct rules, on the authorities, for determining whether
the life tenant or the remaindennan shall take a stock dividend. In substance, Mr. Cook
in his treatise on Coprorations, 6th ed., chap. XXXIII, states the rules as follows: The
majority of Ainerican courts follow the Pennssfrania Rule, which proceeds on the theory
that the court, in disposing of stock or property dividends, as between life tenant and
remainderman, may properly inquire as to the time when the fund out of which the ex·
traordinary dividend is to be paid was earned and .accumulated, and also as to the method
of accumulation. Ii it is found to have accrued or been earned before the life estate
arose, it is held that the remainderman takes, without reference to the time it is declared
or made payable. But when it is found that the fund, out of which the dividend is paid,
accrued or was earned, not before, but after the life estate arose, then it is held that it
belongs to the tenant for life. (Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 368, Wiltbank's Appeal, 69
Pa. St. 256.) The courts in these jurisdictions will also take into consideration the
custom and regularity of the corporation in accumulating its surplus, inasmuch as the
testator may be presumed to have expected the corporation to continue its accumulation
of a surplus or to provide for improvements out of profits. (Spooner v. Phillips, 62
Conn. 62; Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257; Van Doren v. Olden, 19. N. J. Eq. 176.) The rule
which prevails in Massachusetts, and ·at least in three other states, is sometimes called
"the rule in Minot's case." It regards cash dividends, whether large or small, as in·
come, and stock di11idends, whenever earned and however declared, as capital. Cash dividends, in these jurisdictions, belong to the tenant for life and stock dividends to the
corpus (Minot v. raine, 99 Mass. 101). As the rule works a hardship in many instances,
it is not rigidly adhered to, but the court, in deciding whether the distribution is a
stock or cash dividend, may consider the actual and substantial character of the trans·
action, and not its nominal character merely. (Leland v. Hayden, 102 Mass. 542.) In
England, an ordinary, regular, usual cash or stock or property dividend belongs to the
life tenant, while an extraordinary cash or stock or property dividend belongs to the
corpus of the trust (Witts v. Steere, 13 Ves. Jr. 363; Norris v. Harrison, 2 Madd. 268).
:i The court says, at page 527 of 34 L. Ed.:
"In Bailey v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 89 U. S. 22 Wall 604, cited
for the plaintiff, the point decided was that certificates, issued by a railroad cor·
poration to its stockholders as representing earnings which had been used in
the construction and equipment of its road, and payable, at the option of the
company, with dividends like those paid on the stock, were within that provision
Qf the. Internal Revenue Laws, which enacted that any railroad company 'that
may have declared any dividend in script or money due or payable to its stock·
holders.' 'as part of the earnings, profits, income or gains of such company, and
all profits of such company carried to the account of any fund, or used for con·
struction, shall be subject to and pay a tax of five pe"r centum on the amount
of all such' 'dividends or profits, whenever and wherever the same shall be pay·
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appears that the Gibbons Case is in no wise inconsistent with the
proposition here contended for, viz. : Income, when used in a statute
taxing the shareholders of a corporation, in both its popular and
legal sense. has a different meaning than is ordinarily the case.
The case of Logan County v. United States, 22 is likewise one·dealing with the nature of stock dividends. That case merely holds
that where a tax is assessed and collected upon the undivided surplus of a corporation, it will not be presumed that the tax so collected was upon the individual shareholders' undivided interests
where the shareholders in question were municipal corporations, and
hence not subject to the tax. It does not hold that the undivided
corporate surplus cannot be held to be the income of the individual
shareholders when the Congress has designated it as such, but only
that the tax collectors shall not be presumed to have levied a tax
on this income of the individuals where they had no power to do so,
and it is possible to say that the tax was merely upon the corporate
property.
able, and to whatsoever party or person, the same may be payable.' Acts of
June 30, 1864, chap. 173, sec. 122 (13 Stat. 284): July 13, 1886, chap. 184, sec.
9 (14 Stat. 138, 139). The question at issue was not between the owners of

successfoe interests in particular sl1ares, but between the corporation· and the
government, and depended upon the terms of a statute carefully framed to pre·
vent corporations from evading payment of the ta; upon their earnings.''
(Italics ours.)
169 U. S. 255, 42 L. Ed. 737, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 361. This case also arose under the
Income Tax Law of 1864. Plaintiff was seeking a refund of taxes assessed and collected
on the theory that no tax could be laid against municipal corporations. The collector had
previously assessed and collected from the corporation in which plaintiff municipal° corpora·
tion was a shareholder, a tax on its undivided surplus. Thereafter the corporation declared
a stock dividend, said stock dividend being less by the amount of the tax previously im·
posed on the undivided surplus than would otherwise have been the case. The act pro·
vided that a duty of five per cent. should be laid on stock dividends, the deduction to
be made by the corporation.
Held, the stock dividends were not ta.xed, but the only tax levied was against the
surplus belonging to the corporation. But the court expressly held that the United States
could tax a stock dividend· where the shareholder was not a municipal corporation, saying,
at page 739 of 42 L. Ed.:
"By the provisions of the internal revenue act of 1864 (13 Stat. at L. 223,
chap. 173, sec. 122), a stocl< diyidend was subject ~o a t:ix of five per cent. * * *"
"Under this plain provision of the statute it is perfectly clear that the stock
dividend in question was a proper subject of ta.xation. But, as already men·
tioned, there is no finding that any such tax has been paid, and, of course, none
that any deduction on its account was ever made from any dividend due the
coputy. On the contrary, from the findings that have been made, it appears that
the only tax which has been paid was paid by the railroad company upon its
undistributed surplus at a time when such fund was its own absolute property."
It is not to be denied that there is language to the effect that until a cash dividend
is declared, no income accrues to the shareholders. But it is also to be noticed that the
case of Brainard v. Hubbard, supra, is not referred to, and thus presumably not over·
ruled, in view of the fact that the cases are distinguishable.
22
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It will be well now to summarize what has been said thus far:
(I) The Internal Revenue Act of I9I6 lays a tax on all
stock dividends received by corporate shareholders. This tax
.is not apportioned, and therefore is void if,; in the first place,
it is not aµ "income" tax, as that word is used in the Sixteenth Amendment, and if, in the second place, it is a direct
tax.
( 2) To determine the meaning of the word "income,'' as
used in. the Sixteenth Amendment, the current use of the
word at the time the Sixteenth Amendment was enacted
must be looked at, together with all definitions that the Supreme Court of the United States had previously given, and
the language of the preceding.income tax laws.
(a) The leading dictionaries in I9I2 defined "income" as
a gain or profit derived from capital invested. It .is consistent
with this definition to say that "income," as, thus defined, includes the undivided profits or surpfos of a corporation,
whether or not a stock dividend has been declared.
(b) The case of Gibbons v. Mahon and all other cases
dealing with the respective rights of life tenant and remaindermen in the last analysis appear to go off on a different
ground from that of the distinction between capital and income, and are therefore not controlling authorities in this
discussion.
( c) .There appears to be no direct decision on the point
in question by the Supreme Court, but there are three dicta,
one of which states squarely that for the purposes of an income tax law, the undivided corporate surplus may be taxed
as the shareholders' income. If this be true, then a stock
dividend may be so taxed, as its only eIJect is to re-apportion
the respective interest which ~ach shareholder has in this
undivided surplus. · The dicta in the other two Supreme
C9urt decisions are in no wise conflicting with this when the.
facts of the cases under which they· arose· are considered.
(d) A dictum in the case of Gibbons v. Mahon is to the
effect that a different rule may _apply. when the question is
between the government and one questioning a tax, and
when it is between life tenant and remainderman.
( e.) Every income tax law has used the words "gains and
profits" as synonymous with income, and the Act of I864
stated that stock dividends and the corporate undivided surplus were to be taxed as income of the shareholClers.
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(f) The recent case of Towne v. Eisner states nothing
in conflict with these conclusions.
(3) Every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality
of an Act of Congress. It is therefore not necessary to say
that the "income" of a shareholder always includes his pro
rata interest in the corporate undivided surplus, but only that
the word "income," as used by the Supreme Court prior to
the Sixteenth Amendment, may consistently under facts parallel to those now in question, be so construed.
(4) That provision of the Internal Revenue Act of 1916
which defines stock dividends as income, is constitutional,
because "income," as defined by the leading dictionaries, by
Congress, and by the Supreme Court prior to the Sixteenth
Amendment may consistently include the profit or gain of a
stockholder of a corporation arising out of the enhancement
of the value of his interest in the corporate enterprise,
which flows from the corporate earnings. There is no necessity, therefore, to inquire whether or not this is a direct
tax. It is believed that it is, when the substance of things is
considered.
This appears to be a proper solution on principle. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the purposes of the Act. The shareholders,
who are often the ones who vote a stock dividend, could themselves
always defer the collection of a just tax on their earnings till the
crisis had passed and the law had been repealed. It is no answer to
say there is double taxation; because the same double taxation exists
in the case of a cash dividend, and furthermore, there is no,_constitutional inhibition against double taxation. Nor can it be said that
the Act does not purport to tax the undivided corporate surplus, because it does-when a stock dividend is declared. That time is taken
as the most convenient to determine the amount of gains or profits
the shareholders have received in a given calendar year. Furthermore, Section 3 of the Act23 taxes the corporate undivided surplus
when the Secretary of the Treasury believes that an attempt is being made to avoid the Act. It may be argued that even though an
undivided corporate profit may be thought of as the income of the
. shareholders, when this is transferred to capital stock, it
thereupon ceases to be income and is no longer taxable; and
that this is especially true when the shareholders themselves have
no word in such trans£ er and no control over it. But the answer
is, that once ~'the thing is ascertained as being subject to the income
23 Act of Sept. 8, 1916, part l, sec. 3:
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tax, it matters not what is done with it afterwards." 24 Nor does it
make any difference that the one taxed has no power over the fund
so subject to the tax, because he receives his- benefit if it is put to a
corporate use.
RoBERT

E.

MoRE.

Denver, Colorado.
"'H. R. H. The Nizam State Ry. Co. v. Wyatt, (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 598. Here a
corporation was contesting the collection of an income tax. 16 and 17 Viet." c. 34 imposed
duties O!l gains and profits according to five schedules. Schedule C was as follows:
"Schedule C. For in respect of all profits arising from interest, annuities,
dividends and shares of annuities, payable to any person, body politic or cor·
porate." * • *
The corpt-ration had a contract whereby it was bound to apply one per cent. of an
annuity to be received from the Nizam of Hyderabad to trustees to form a sinking fund
for the redemption. of the debenture capital. The company claimed to deduct the amount
put into the sinking fund, claiming it could not be income inasmuch as they bad no power
over it. The court held that this part of the annuity was subject to the tax, saying,
through Hawkins, J., at page 556:
"It seems to me that the application of the money has not so very much to
do with the matter. The money paid by the Nizam is paid as income and in the
company's bands is income, which they are bound to apply, no doubt, to pay•
ment of their just liabilities to shareholders, and debenture holders, and to a
sinking fund. But it is income prepaid, which has to be applied and appro·
priated in the interests of the company. I cannot regard it as other than income
supplied by the Nizam under his contract, and when it comes into the hands
of the company it is, I think, in the same condition as income earned, subject
only to this difference, that it does not rest with the directors to decide whether
a sinking fund shall be create4 or not, but there is an obligation on them to
create a sinking fund imposed by the contract under which the income is supplied. * * *"

